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ANOMALIES IN THE US
CYBERBULLYING JURISPRUDENCE
by
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This article focused on US case law and analyzed the evolution of students’ freedom
of speech from 1969 to this date in the US. Therefore, it briefly introduced the tests
and doctrines,  which were created in the landmark cases of  the  Supreme Court
of the United States (SCOTUS), noting that these cases were dealing with offline,
on-campus situations and their determinations are not necessarily fully applicable
to  situations  we  might  experience  today.  Nevertheless,  the  tests  and doctrines,
which were created in SCOTUS landmark decisions, are still in force and every
cyberbullying  judgment  is  still  based  on  them even  in  the  era  of  the  Internet.
Taking  into  consideration  that  the  world  has  changed  since  these  tests  were
established,  I  examined  some  more  recent  cyberbullying  cases  in  the  US,
where these above tests were applied.
Based  on  the  analysis  of  SCOTUS and  some  Circuit  Court  jurisprudence,
Certain anomalies were revealed, which serve as a basis to clearly state that the US
system  suffers  from  severe  deficiencies,  like  handling  the  off-campus  origin
of the speech,  or  defining  the  substantial  disruption  or  the  sufficient  nexus.
However, the US courts have worked out tests and doctrines as a basis for their
cyberbullying jurisprudence, so they are on the right track, but the jurisprudence
will remain ambiguous and unpredictable without a SCOTUS landmark decision
regarding cyberbullying.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In  this  article,  I  focused  on  US  case  law  and  analyzed  the  evolution
of students’ (age 10-18) freedom of speech from 1969 to this date in the US,
in  order  to  reveal  particular  anomalies  in  the  relevant  jurisprudence.
Therefore, I briefly introduced the tests and doctrines, which were created
in landmark decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS),
like  Tinker1,  Fraser2,  Hazelwood3 and  Morse4, noting  that  these  cases  were
dealing with offline, on-campus situations and their determinations are not
necessarily  fully  applicable  to  situations  we  might  experience  today.
Nevertheless, the tests and doctrines, which were created in US landmark
decisions,  are still  in  force  and,  in  the  era  of the Internet,  cyberbullying
judgments are based on them. Taking into consideration that the world has
changed  since  these  tests  were  established,  I  examined  some  recent  US
cyberbullying  cases  (Snyder5,  Layshock6,  Kowalski7),  where  the  above  tests
were  applied.  In  these  decisions  I  highlighted  the  crucial  elements
and problems  due  to  the  evolution  of  technology  and  lapse  of  time.
For instance, the Third Circuit Court of the United States Court of Appeals
evaluated similar facts in a different way in two cases heard on the same
day, which forced them to reconsider one of their decisions. Furthermore,
the Fourth Circuit Court of the United States Court of Appeals transformed
off-campus speech into on-campus, but applied the general test to the case
instead of the special on-campus tests.
Based on a brief analysis of SCOTUS cases concerning students’ freedom
of  speech  and  the  Circuit  Courts’  cyberbullying  jurisprudence,  we  can
clearly  state  that  the  US  system  suffers  from  severe  deficiencies,
like handling  the  off-campus  origin  of  the  speech,  or  defining
the substantial  disruption  test,  or  clarifying  when  a  sufficient  nexus
between  off-campus  speech  and  an  actual  or  reasonable  foreseeable
substantial  disruption  stands.  US  courts  have  worked  out  tests
and doctrines as a basis for their cyberbullying jurisprudence, but still this
1 Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Distr., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
3 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
4 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
5 JS Ex Rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F. 3d 915 - Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit
2011.
6 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F. 3d 249 - Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 2010.
7 Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F. 3d 565 - Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit 2011.
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jurisprudence  suffers  from  the  ambiguous  and  diverse  judgments
of the Circuit Courts. Nothing short of a landmark SCOTUS decision could
resolve  this  issue  and  dispel  the  existing  ambiguity  regarding
cyberbullying.
2. ANALYSIS OF US JURISPRUDENCE
2.1  TESTS  AND  DOCTRINES  ESTABLISHED  BY  SCOTUS
LANDMARK CASES ON STUDENTS’ FREEDOM OF SPEECH
First  of  all,  we  should  very  briefly  introduce  the  evolution  of  students’
freedom  of  speech  and  applicable  tests  and  doctrines.  Taking  into
consideration  that  in  its  majority  literature  on  cyberbullying  frequently
summarizes  all  relevant  landmark  cases  as  well  as  cites  the  decision
statements,  which  gave  birth  to  the  discussed  doctrinal  developments,8
here I  would  rather  just  list  the  established  tests,  and  focus  more
on the cyberbullying cases.
Following  this  logic,  the  first  test  is  the  ‘substantial  disruption  test’
in connection with the ‘collision with the rights of others’ argument created
in  Tinker.  The essence of this first  test is  that no action will  be protected
under the First Amendment that would constitute a material or substantial
disruption  to  the  school  environment  or  might  have  a  foreseeable  risk
of such  disruption.  At  first  glance,  it  looks  like  a  perfect  solution
to on-campus  problems,  but  we  will  see  its  defects  as  we  move  on
to students’ virtual speech.
In the  second landmark  decision,  the  Fraser doctrine  established  that
vulgar, lewd, offensive student speech is not a protected speech by the US
Constitution.  Furthermore,  in  this  judgment  SCOTUS  clearly  expressed
that the students’  right is  not  coextensive  with the adults’.  This  leads us
8 Horowitz,  M.,  Bollinger  M.,  D.  2014.  Cyberbullying  in  Social  Media  within  Educational
Institutions - Featuring student, employee, and parent information, Rowman & Littlefield,
United Kingdom, pp.50-53.
Auerbach, S., 2008-2009. ‘Screening Out Cyberbullies: Remedies for Victims on the Internet
Playground’, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 30, 1648-1652.
Hostetler R., D. 2014. ‘Off-Campus Cyberbullying: First Amendment Problems, Parameters,
and Proposals’, Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal, no. 1, pp. 4-6.
Erb  D.,  T.  2008.  ‘A  Case  For  Strengthening  School  District  Jurisdiction  To  Punish
Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying’, Arizona State Law Journal, vol. 40, pp. 261-263.
Greenhill,  J.  2010-2011.  ‘From  The  Playground  To  Cyberspace:  The Evolution
Of Cyberbullying’, Charleston Law Review, vol. 5, pp. 724-728.
Pongó, T. 2015.  ‘Anglo-Saxon Approaches To Students’ Freedom Of Speech And Cyberbullying:
Constitutional  Foundations  For  A  Comparative  Analysis,  ed.  S.C.  Universul  Juridic  S.R.L.,
Timisoara, pp. 539-541.
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to the following  hypothetical  case:  imagine  a  student  (age  14)  delivering
lewd and offensive speech in the school, which is not protected by freedom
of expression according to Fraser, and then imagine the same student, now
as an adult, delivering the same speech fifteen years later in the same place
to the same audience (let us say at a school reunion). In this case, this exact
same speech will be protected under the First Amendment.
As for  the third test,  in  Hazelwood, the SCOTUS declared that  speech
at a school-sponsored event,  venue or forum (also a newspaper),  may be
regulated by the school (Hazelwood doctrine).
In a fourth landmark decision, Morse, it was stated that promoting illegal
drug  use  or  any  other  activity  prohibited  by  policy,  which  is  against
the school’s  educational  mission,  will  not  be  protected  by  the  First
Amendment.9
Consequently, in the judicial practice, courts evaluate all circumstances
and facts of the case and try to apply any of the above-mentioned tests.
For instance, if vulgar or lewd student speech “is on the table”, then Fraser
will be called in, and cases involving the school-sponsored element will be
decided upon  Hazelwood.  If  any of these doctrines do not cover the facts
of the case, then the “jolly joker”,  Tinker’s ‘substantial disruption test’ will
be  applied,10 which  actually  favors  the  students,  not  school  employees
or school administration.
2.2 SAME COURT, SAME DAY, DIFFERENT DECISIONS
2.2.1 THE SNYDER I-II DECISIONS
On 4 February 2010, two cases with very similar factual backgrounds were
decided by the Third Circuit.11 After I shortly introduce the circumstances
and the reasoning of those cases, I am going to conclude that off-campus
speech with on-campus effect is a burning, unresolved problem in the US.
In Snyder I-II12 an eighth grader, J.S., along with her friend, created a fake
MySpace profile  with  vulgar,  lewd,  sexually  explicit,  offensive  language
9 See Auerbach 2008-2009, pp. 1651-1652.
10 Hostetler 2014, p. 19.
11 Weil  A.,  O.  2012-2013.  ‘Preserving  The  Schoolhouse  Gates:  An  Analytical  Framework
For Curtailing Cyberbullying Without Eroding Students’ Constitutional Rights’,  Ave Maria
Law Review, vol. 11, p. 554.
12 JS Ex Rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F. 3d 915 - Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit
2011 (The  Snyder I Third Circuit Court opinion was filed on 4 February 2010, but it was
overruled in Snyder II, filed on 13 June 2011).
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about  their  school  principal.13 The  key  issue  of  this  case  was  a  profile
created  at  home,  during  non-school  hours  and  on  a  parent-owned
computer,  albeit  having  a  great  effect  on  the  school  environment.14
In consequence of the outrageous15 language no one took this profile or its
content seriously.16,17 Furthermore, the profile was not opened in the school,
because  MySpace  was  blocked  on  school  computers,  and  it  was  set  to
“private”  on  the  day  following  its  creation;18 the  only  printout,
which reached  the  school  premises,  was  expressly  asked  for
by the principal.19 Leaving  these  facts  out  of  consideration,  the  School
District decided that the profile disrupted the school environment, because
there were general “rumblings”,  some students talked about it  for a few
minutes  (even though the  teachers  stated that  chatting  in  a  class  is  not
unusual)  and Counselor  Frain,  the  principal’s  wife,  had  to  cancel  some
of her appointments.20 Based upon these facts,  the District  Court decided
that there is no substantial disruption; therefore,  Tinker  is not applicable.21
However, the District Court stated that
“as  a  vulgar,  lewd,  and  potentially  illegal  speech  that  had  an  effect
on campus,  we  find  that  the  school  did  not  violate  the  plaintiff’s  right
in punishing her for it even though it arguably did not cause a substantial
disruption of the school.”22,23
This  reasoning  follows  the  judicial  practice  (backwards24)  that  vulgar
and lewd student speech should be decided upon Fraser  instead of  Tinker.
The District Court arranged its arguments in eight points and
13 Snyder I pp. 4-5; Snyder II pp. 2-3.
14 Snyder I p. 11; Snyder II p. 3.
15 Outrageousness test as an element of the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
see AUERBACH 2008-2009 pp. 1669-1670.
16 Snyder II p. 4.
17 Hostetler 2014, p. 20.
18 Snyder I p. 7; Snyder II p. 4.
19 Snyder I p. 8; Snyder II p. 4-5.
20 Snyder I p. 11-12; Snyder II p. 7.
21 Snyder I p. 14.
22 Snyder II p. 8.
23 See more Snyder I p. 14.
24 Backwards i.e. there is no necessity to define why the case does not fall under Tinker, if it
contains vulgar, lewd or offensive speech, but the District Court did.
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“rejected  several  other  district  court  decisions,  where  the  courts did  not
allow  schools  to  punish  speech  that  occured  off  campus,  including
the decision in Layshock”25,
(Layshock will have a significant meaning later on), to address its judgment.
In  its  decision,  the  Court  ruled  that  there  is  no  substantial  disruption
and this case was decided upon Fraser.26
In the following, I analyze in two parts the two Third Circuit  rulings.
In the interest  of  easier  understanding,  the first  decision  will  be  referred
as Snyder I and the second as Snyder II.
Snyder I was filed on 4 February 2010.27 The Court laid down at the very
beginning  of  its  judgment,  without  reasoning,28 that  this  case  cannot  be
decided upon Fraser, but falls under  Tinker.29 According to the ‘substantial
disruption test’ they examined whether J.S.’s speech created a substantial
disruption in the school environment, or there was any significant risk of its
occurrence.  The Third  Circuit  emphasized  and cited  Tinker to  determine
the essence of substantiality, as
“undifferentiated  fear  or  apprehension  of disturbance  is  not  enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression”.30
Moreover,  they  focused  on  the  reasonable  foreseeability  element
of the test,  which  allows  school  authorities  to  curb  students’  freedom
of speech  before  a  substantial  disruption  or  material  interference  even
occur.31 Elsewhere in the judgment, the Court held that in the case at hand
the profile did not reach the level of actual substantial disruption, although
“the  profile’s  potential  to  cause  a  substantial  disruption  of  the  school  was
reasonably foreseeable.”32 The vulgarity, lewdness and very offensive nature
of the profile’s  language  served  as  the  basis  for  this  statement.33
Furthermore, they highlighted the fact that the parents, who were not so
25 Snyder II p. 9.
26 Snyder II p. 9.
27 From this point every citation relies on Snyder I.
28 Judge Chagares in his dissent mentioned that the majority declined to decide whether J.S.
could be punished under Fraser. See dissent p. 55.
29 Snyder I p. 20.
30 Id. p. 21 cited Tinker.
31 Id. pp. 21-22.
32 Id. pp. 23-24.
33 Id. p. 24.
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familiar  with  the  principal’s  conduct  and  personality,  could  have  taken
the profile’s content seriously, which established a reasonable fear of future
disruption.34 Nevertheless, the Court went further and expressly held that
“the potential  impact  of  the profile’s  language alone is  enough to satisfy
the Tinker substantial disruption test.”35
(I should mention here that the Court analyzed Layshock very briefly, which
will have a significant meaning later on in this article,  but found the two
cases distinguishable, by reason of the lack of sufficient nexus.)
Upon the foregoing arguments, the Third Circuit ruled that the School
District did not violate J.S.’s free speech rights.36,37
Finally, an interesting fact and approach in the cases at hand was that
Snyder  I was  written  by  Circuit  Judge  Fisher,  and  was  decided  upon
the reasonable  foreseeability  of  a  substantial  disruption.  In  Snyder  II,
which is  analyzed  below,  Judge  Fisher  wrote  the  dissenting  opinion
and argued in favor of the foreseeability as well.38
Circuit  Judge  Chagares  (who  actually  wrote  the  majority  opinion
of the Snyder II) concurred and dissented in part. In his dissent he held that
no student can be punished for a speech, which is off-campus and causes
no substantial  disruption  nor  is  school-sponsored.  Neither  of  these
circumstances  stood  in  the  present  case,  and  he  found  the  arguments
of the majority  unsatisfactory  to  establish  a  reasonable  forecast
of substantial  disruption.39 Furthermore,  he  cited  the  District  Court’s
and the majority’s opinion, and according to those there was no substantial
disruption  at  all.  In  his  opinion,  to  overcome  this  hurdle  by  relying
on the sister  courts’  decision  was  not  convincing  enough,  because  those
cited cases are distinguishable from the one at hand.40 Moreover, he rejected
the assertion of the majority that the parents could have taken the profile
seriously and not let their children to go to school, simply because Chagares
found the profile so outrageous and profane that no one could have taken it
34 Id. p. 26.
35 Id. p. 29.
36 Id. p. 33; p. 42.
37 Weil 2012-2013, p. 555.
38 For detailed information see dissent (below) in Snyder II.
39 Snyder I dissent p. 43.
40 Id. p. 56, p. 58.
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seriously.41 Thus, such a profile could not cause any foreseeable disruption
in  a  school  environment.42 Taking  these  facts  into  consideration,
he dissented  and held that  the  School  District  violated J.S.’s  free  speech
rights.43 Although the majority opinion did not deal with  Fraser,  he cited
Chief  Justice  Roberts’s  statement  in  Morse, when  Chief  Justice  cited
Cohen v. Cal. (403 U.S. 15 (1971) and concluded that Fraser cannot be applied
to off-campus cases.44
Following the  Snyder I  decision,  Snyder II was filed by the same Court
en banc  a year later, in 2011. The great significance of the second ruling is
that the Court held that the School District violated J.S.’s right to freedom
of speech, because (i) there was no substantial disruption or any foreseeable
risk  thereof  and  (ii)  Fraser  is  applicable  only  to  on-campus  speech,
but the present  fake  profile  creation  was  not  on-campus  and  did  not
transform later on into on-school speech.45
The Third Circuit highlighted the most crucial problem of cyberbullying
in the US context, which makes the whole system suffer, namely
“[s]ince  Tinker,  courts  have  struggled  to  strike  a  balance  between
safeguarding  students’  First  Amendment  rights  and  protecting
the authority of school administrators to maintain an appropriate learning
environment”.46
Firstly,  the  Court  examined  the  applicability  of  Tinker,  albeit  both
the School  District  and  the  District  Court  admitted  that  there  was
no substantial  disruption  in  the  school  environment.  They  explored
whether the foregoing facts (rumblings, talking in classes and cancellation
of consultations)  could  lead  to  foreseeable  disruption  in  the  future
and emphasized that the Court should define how an
“undifferentiated  fear  or  apprehension  of  disturbance  transforms
into a reasonable  forecast  that  a substantial  disruption  or  material
interference will occur.”47
41 Id. p. 60; p. 63.
42 Id. p. 63.
43 Id. p. 65.
44 Id. pp.66-67.
45 From this point on, every footnote refers to Snyder II.
46 Snyder II p. 12.
47 Id. p. 19.
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These facts serve as factors,  which should be considered to determine
a level of disturbance.48 Taking into consideration that the fake profile was
so  profane  and outrageous  that  no  one  could  have  taken  it  seriously,
it could  not  constitute  any  material  disruption  in  the  future,  and  thus
neither  the foreseeability  element  of  Tinker  could  stand.49,50 In  balance
with Snyder  I,  the  Court  reconsidered  the  weight  of  the  circumstances
in favor of the student. Moreover, the Court stated, J.S. took all necessary
steps  to avoid  that  the  profile  made  its  way  to  campus,  which  proved
the fact  that  she  did  not  want  to  target  the  school  environment.
Bear in mind,  however,  that  the  whole  scenario  took  place  off-campus,
during non-school hours, on a parent-owned computer.51
Secondly,  as  far  as  Tinker was  not  applicable  to  the  case  at  hand,
the Court  focused on the  Fraser doctrine,  just  like  the District  Court  had
done before. As we mentioned before, if a case of vulgar or lewd student
speech arises, it was to be decided upon Fraser, not upon Tinker. However,
the Third Circuit  first  analyzed the case under the substantial  disruption
test, instead of following the  Fraser  doctrine. Even though they evaluated
and  applied  Fraser,  the  logic  of  this  application  is  questionable.
The SCOTUS guidelines in this respect are clear:  Tinker works as a general
test,  if  no  other  doctrine  provides  a  basis  to  decide  a  student  freedom
of speech  case.  On the  contrary,  the  Third  Circuit  began their  reasoning
with the analysis of Tinker and not of Fraser. At first glance, it does not seem
such a big issue, but still raises the question of why: why should we use
a general  test  before a special  one,  a  method which,  actually,  contradicts
the fundamental legal principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali.52 At least,
however,  this  time  the  Court  justified  why  Fraser  was  not  applicable,
compared  to  Snyder  I,  where  the  Third  Circuit  had  just  simply,
without reasoning, ruled to apply Tinker.53
Besides  this  theoretical  approach,  the Third Circuit  explored the facts
under  Fraser. The  School  District  and  the  District  Court  based  their
48 Ere 2008, p. 266.
49 Horowitz – Bollinger 2014, p. 47.
50 Bendlin S.,  S.  2013, ’Cyberbullying:  When is  it  „School Speech” And When is it  Beyond
the School’s Reach?’, Northeastern University Law Journal, vol. 5 p. 57.
51 The  dissenting  opinion  concluded  that  this  majority  opinion  constitutes  a  circuit  split
withJthe Second Circuit Court. See Snyder II dissent p. 22.
52 This  theory  means  that  every  special  test  or  doctrine  deteriorates  the  general  test
in the same field of law. Just like Fraser did with Tinker.
53 See Snyder I p. 20.
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decisions upon this doctrine, because even though the conduct examined
occurred  off-campus,  it  had  a  significant  on-campus  effect.  However,
under SCOTUS  landmark  rulings,  Fraser is  not  applicable  to  off-campus
cases,  irrespective  of  the  fact  whether  it  has  any  effect  on  the  school
environment  or  not.  The  Circuit  Court  strengthened the  aforementioned
jurisprudence furthermore: they emphasized Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
in Morse, when he cited Cohen and according to that reaffirmed that
“a student’s  free  speech  rights  outside  the  school  context  are  coextensive
with the rights of an adult.”54
In addition,
“[t]he  most  logical  reading of  Chief  Justice  Roberts’s  statement prevents
the application of Fraser to speech that takes place off-campus, during non-
school hours, and that is in no way sponsored by school.”55
Accordingly,  the school  authority  cannot  be  expanded to such  extent
that  the  school  could  -  hypothetically  -  punish  two students  for  talking
about their  teachers  using vulgar  comments  at  a  house  party.  This  may
sound as an absurd presumption, but if  Snyder II would be ruled in favor
of the School District under  Fraser,  then the house party hypothesis could
occur  and  would  be  followed  by  lawful  action  issued  by  the  school
authorities. However, we should bear in mind that  Fraser is not applicable
to  off-campus  speech;  therefore,  a  house  party  would  be  a  safe  haven
to the students.  The  Third  Circuit  strengthened  this  position  in  Snyder  I
by stating that
“[s]ince we are expressly not applying Fraser to conduct off school grounds,
there is no risk that a vulgar comment made outside the school environment
will  result  in  school  discipline  absent  a  significant  risk  of  a  substantial
disruption at the school.”56
In  summary,  the  Third  Circuit  concluded  that  the  School  District
violated  J.S.’s  right  to  free  speech,  because  Fraser  is  not  applicable  to
off-campus cases and there was not any substantial disruption in the school
54 Snyder II p. 23 cited Morse.
55 Id. p. 23.
56 Snyder I pp. 27-28 footnote 8.
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environment; further the foreseeable risk of disruption could be excluded,
by reason of the online profile’s flippancy.
The  majority  opinion  left  a  crucial  question  unanswered,  namely
whether Tinker is applicable to off-campus speech or not. In his concurring
opinion, Circuit Judge Smith stated that
“[he]  would  hold  that  it  does  not,  and  the  First  Amendment  protects
students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it protects speech
by citizens in the community at large.”57
Moreover,  he  cited  Justice  Alito’s  concurring  opinion  in  Morse,
who ruled that
“Tinker’s substantial disruption test does not apply to students’ off-campus
expression.”58
Judge  Smith  emphasized  that  if  Tinker would  be  applicable  to  any
off-campus speech
“there would be little reason to prevent school officials from regulating adult
speech uttered in the community.”59
As it has been suggested in academic writing
“[d]etermining where internet speech occurs is almost as thorny an issue
as determining when life begins”.60
Leading  the  dissent,  Circuit  Judge  Fisher  (maintaining  the  same
reasoning  that  he  had  written  as  majority  opinion  in  Snyder  I),  held
that J.S.’s  conduct  could have led to a reasonably  foreseeable  substantial
disruption. The personal attack towards the school principal and his family
caused psychological  harm to  them,  and also  undermined “the  authority
of the school.”61 The sufficient nexus between J.S.’s speech and the substantial
disruption  in  the  school  environment  served  as  basis  for  Judge  Fisher’s
dissent,62 who, moreover, emphasized that this nexus distinguished the case
57 Snyder II concurring opinion p. 1.
58 Id. p. 4 citing Morse Justice Alito’s concurring opinion.
59 Id. p. 7.
60 Bendlin 2013, p. 48.
61 Snyder II dissenting opinion p. 2.
62 Id. p. 9.
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at  hand  from  Layshock (analyzed  next).63 In  his  argumentation,
he highlighted  the  two  forms  of  reasonably  foreseeable  substantial
disruption:  (i)  reasonably  foreseeable  threat  of  interference
with the educational  environment,  that  if  went  unpunished  it  would
undermine the principal’s  authority and disrupt the educational  process;
and  (ii)  foreseeable  threat  of  disrupting  the  classroom’s  operations.64
Proving  his  dissent,  he  stated  that  the  majority  opinion  misconstrued
the facts of the case65 and the level of substantial disruption.66
The dissent clearly agreed with the application of  Tinker to off-campus
cases67, which however directly contradicts the concurring opinion by Smith
to the same decision.
In  the  present  case  (Snyder  II),  Judge  Fisher  emphasized  that
his disagreement was based upon the different interpretation of the facts,
and by virtue of this, he was inclined to rule in favor of the School District.68
2.2.2  LAYSHOCK-ING  REVELATION  –  THE  IMPORTANCE
OF SUFFICIENT NEXUS
Layshock69 was decided on 4 February 2010, on the exact date of the Snyder I
decision by the same (Third Circuit) Court.70
Justin Layshock, a high school student, created a fake MySpace profile
about his  principal  during non-school hours,  in  his  grandmother’s home
and on her computer.71 For this action the School District suspended him
and took several additional steps in punishing him.72 During that time more
profiles  were  created  on  MySpace  about  the  school  principal,  but  only
Layshock  was  punished  for  his  actions,  even  though  other  profiles
contained  more  vulgar  and  offensive  language.73 His  profile  was  set
to “private”,  therefore  only  invited  students  could  check  it,  but  it  was
opened in  school,  during  school  hours.  However,  no  one could  identify
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. p. 10.
66 Id. p. 16.
67 Id. p. 16 footnote 4.
68 Id. p. 26.
69 Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F. 3d 249 - Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 2010.
70 Weil 2012-2013, p.555; Hostetler 2014, p. 17.
71 Layshock p. 5; p. 7.
72 He  was  being  placed  in  an  Alternative  Education  Program,  being  banned  from  all
extracurricular activities, not being allowed to attend his graduation ceremony. Id. p. 15-16.
73 Id. p. 10; p. 16.
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how many students accessed any of the profiles,  and which profiles were
actually checked.74
In view of this  factual  background, the District  Court had previously
held  that  the  School  District  had  violated  Layshock’s  rights  to  freedom
of speech. In their ruling, the District Court had emphasized that the School
District
“could not establish the sufficient nexus between Justin’s speech and the
substantial disruption of the school environment.”75,76
We  should  bear  in  mind  that  Snyder  I-II  had  very  similar  factual
backgrounds  to  Layshock,  but  in  those  decisions  (both  judgments)
the sufficient  nexus  under  Tinker was  not  examined,  because  the  facts
of that  case  excluded  actual  substantial  disruption.  At  the  same  time,
Snyder I considered  foreseeable  disruption,  which  was  not  explored
in Layshock, in the Third Circuit Court decision. These little anomalies make
cyberbullying  jurisprudence  in  US  courts  too  vague  and  unpredictable
to practitioners, school administrations and academic scholars as well.
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit Court concluded that they would
“not allow the School District to stretch its authority so far that it reaches
Justin while he is sitting in his grandmother’s home after school.”77,78
This  argumentation  could  also  apply  to  the  abovementioned
hypothetical  case,  where,  under  Fraser, two  students  could  have  been
punished  for  talking  vulgarly  and  offensively  about  a  school  employee
at a house party; following Layshock, in such a scenario, the school cannot
punish. Moreover, the statement in Snyder I that
“the potential  impact  of  the profile’s  language alone is  enough to satisfy
the Tinker substantial disruption test”,79
was actually reconsidered and overruled in  Snyder II, under the foregoing
reasons.80
74 Id. p. 13.
75 Id. p. 31 citing Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
76 Weil 2012-2013, p. 555.
77 Layshock p. 36.
78 Hostetler 2014, p. 18.
79 Snyder I p. 29.
80 Weil 2013-2013, p. 556.
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In summary, a school cannot have such an extensive authority that it
could  punish  students  for  actions  not  causing  any  actual  substantial
or reasonably foreseeable disruption in the school environment. This point
was clearly affirmed in both Snyder II and Layshock.
The School District also argued before the Third Circuit that the profile
could  be  interpreted  and  treated  as  on-campus  speech,  as  aiming
at the school  community,  being  accessed  from  the  school,  and  such
accessibility made
“reasonably  foreseeable  that  the  profile  would  come  to  the  attention
of the School district and the Principal.”81,82
In its  analysis  of the facts,  the District  Court had held that there was
no evidence for any lewd or profane expression by Layshock on-campus,
making thus Fraser inapplicable;83 and, furthermore, that the School District
could not establish a sufficient nexus as required by Tinker, between speech
and  any  substantial  disruption  in  the  school  environment.84 Taking
the foregoing  ruling  into  consideration,  the  School  District  maintained
the position  that  the  profile  was  vulgar,  lewd  and  offensive  and  not
shielded by the First Amendment, relying on  Fraser.85 However, to prove
its point the School District cited only such cases, which had been decided
upon the substantial disruption test and not under Fraser.86
In  consequence,  the  Third  Circuit  found  that  the  School  District’s
argument  was  vague  and,  not  enough  evidence  was  provided  to  treat
the profile as on-campus speech.  Fraser was not applicable and the Court
highlighted  their  task  to  declare  that,  whereas  Justin’s  speech  was  not
on-campus and did not disrupt the school’s work, the School District had
no authority  to  punish  him  without  the  violation  of  the  First
Amendment.87,88
In  comparison  with  Snyder  I-II,  we  can  clearly  see  the  “bedrock
principles”  of  the  jurisprudence,  namely  that  Fraser  is  only  applicable
81 Layshock p. 31, p. 38.
82 Pongó 2015, p. 542.
83 Layshock p. 38.
84 Id.
85 Id. p. 39.
86 See id. pp. 41-46.
87 Id. p. 48.
88 Bendlin 2013, p. 58.
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to on-campus  cases  and  Tinker requires  a  substantial  disruption
in the school environment. However, we can also identify the main points
that are to be debated and questioned in such occurrences: when and under
which  circumstances  an  off-campus  speech  becomes  on-campus?
How could  school  administration  provide  enough  evidence  to  establish
a foreseeable  disruption  in  the  school  environment  and  what  evidence
could  sufficiently  establish  such  foreseeable  disruption  in  the  same
environment?  Furthermore,  how  can  the  school  prove  the  existence
of a sufficient  nexus  between  the  students’  speech  and  the  reasonably
foreseeable  substantial  disruption?  These  questions  continue  to  remain
unanswered by the SCOTUS to this date, which encumbers school officials
and  leave  them  in  an  ambiguous  position  when  it  comes  to  tackling
cyberbullying cases.89
2.3 KOWALSKI90 CASE
Up to this point  Snyder I-II  and Layshock  dealt with free speech in relation
to a student  and school personnel.  In  Kowalski,  this  changed importantly
to a student-on-student speech incident.
Kara  Kowalski  was  a  high  school  senior,  who  created  the  MySpace
group S.A.S.H., inviting approximately 100 students to join.91 The acronym
S.A.S.H.  had  two  interpretations.  According  to  Kowalski  it  referred
to Students Against Sluts Herpes, but Ray Parsons, a classmate and active
participant of the group, stated it meant Students Against Shay’s Herpes.
Shay was the targeted student, fact that was proven by posted comments,
images, and photographs.92 Although, Kowalski created the profile at home,
Parsons  was  the  first  member  to  access  the  MySpace  group on-campus
from a school computer. He created images, all depicting Shay as a “whore”
with  herpes  everywhere,  including  her  pelvic  area.93 As  punishment
the school  suspended  Kowalski  for  ten  days  and  issued  a  90-day  social
suspension (prevented her from being Queen of Charm and participating
in the  cheerleader  squad).  On  request  of  Kowalski’s  father,  the  school
89 See Ere 2008, pp. 271-272.
90 Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F. 3d 565 - Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit 2011.
91 Id. pp. 2-3.
92 Id. p. 3.
93 Id. p. 4.
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administration reduced school suspension to 5 days, but retained the social
penalty.94 Due to the profile Shay didn’t want to attend school.95
In  consequence  of  this  punishment  Kowalski  filed  a  suit  against
the School District  and some school employees alleging that her freedom
of speech was violated by the school’s actions. The District Court dismissed
her  claim.96 Kowalski  claimed  that  her  speech  originated  off-campus
and was  non-school  related,  therefore,  the  school  administration  had
no authority to punish her.97 Contrary to Kowalski’s statement, the School
District emphasized that if an off-campus speech causes a foreseeable risk
of reaching  the  school  premises  and  creating  substantial  disruption,
then the  school  has  the  power  to  curb  her  free  speech  rights.
Under the circumstances  of  the  case  at  hand,  Kowalski’s  only  purpose
with the  profile  was  to  target  Shay,  humiliate  and  bully  her  online.
(Actually,  she  reached  this  goal,  since  Shay  didn’t  attend  her  classes
on the day  following  the  group’s  creation  as  feeling  uncomfortable
about sitting  in  class  next  to  her  abusers.)  Moreover,  Kowalski  invited
others from the same high school to join the group, thus she had to foresee
that her off-campus conduct would reach school premises and would cause
substantial disruption.98
On  appeal,  the  Fourth  Circuit  took  all  facts  into  consideration,
and explored the basis of Kowalski’s defense, which was that her conduct
enjoyed the full protection of the First Amendment due to the off-campus
origin of the speech. However, the Court argued that, although her speech
originated literally outside of the school premises,
“she knew that the electronic response would be, as it in fact was, published
beyond  her  home  and  could  reasonably  be  expected  to  reach  the  school
or impact the school environment.”99
According to this reasoning, the Fourth Circuit transformed Kowalski’s
off-campus  speech  into  on-campus,  which  also  marked a  crucial  change
regarding the application of law, since from that point on, every SCOTUS
94 Id. p. 6.
95 Id. p. 5.
96 Id. p. 9.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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test  and  doctrine  in  this  field  instantly  became  relevant  to  the  case
at hand.100 Furthermore, the Court referred to the reasonable foreseeability
element of Tinker, which, had not stood in Snyder II. Moreover, the Fourth
Circuit stated being
“satisfied that the nexus of Kowalski’s speech to Musselman High School’s
pedagogical  interests  was  sufficiently  strong  to  justify  the  action  taken
by school officials in carrying out their role as the trustees of the student
body’s well-being.”101
In comparison with the above-analyzed  Snyder I-II  and Layshock  cases,
we can conclude that under facts very similar to those of Kowalski, the Third
Circuit  did  not  find  reasonably  foreseeable  substantial  disruption
in Snyder II;  nor  a  sufficient  nexus  between  individual  student  speech
and school disruption in Layshock. However, the Fourth Circuit, in Kowalski,
explicitly  declared  the  existence  of  both  of  these  Tinker  elements.102
We should mention,  though,  that,  since  the  analysis in Kowalski contains
speculative  and conclusory determinations  about  the effect  of  the online
group  page,  it can  easily  be  argued  as  not  being  part  of  the  “judicial
mainstream”.103
One significant difference to the backgrounds of the other cases is that
in Kowalski the  target  was  another  student  and  not  a  school  employee.
(However,  we  should  keep  in  mind  that  even  the  student-on-student
scenario  involves  some  school  action,  like  suspension  or  expulsion.)
In a student-on-student  scenario  the  Fourth  Circuit  explored  both
foreseeable disruption and sufficient nexus and both were found to stand,
even though Kowalski herself did not refer to sufficient nexus. (Auerbach
argues  that  student-on-student  cases  are  factually  distinct
from cyberbullying  cases,  which  mainly  target  school  employees.104)
The Court  also  highlighted  that  even  though  Kowalski’s  speech  turned
into on-campus,105 they  didn’t  have  to  explore  the  case  under  Fraser,
100 Pongó 2015, p. 543.
101 Kowalski p. 14.
102 Horowitz – Bollinger 2014, p. 38.
103 Hostetler 2014, p. 14.
104 Auerbach 2008-2009, p. 1654.
105 Regardless of the origin of the speech, it directed at persons in school, therefore, it  was
in fact in-school speech. See. Kowalski p.14.
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because the school’s  action was permissible  under  Tinker.106 In the above
analyzed Snyder II  and Layshock, the Third Circuit did not evaluate vulgar
and  offensive  profiles,  which  targeted  school  principals,  on-campus,
but the Fourth Circuit did find the creation of a group on MySpace to be on-
campus speech.107 The Fourth Circuit reasoned why Kowalski’s speech was
turned into on-campus speech, yet, contrary to the  lex specialis derogat legi
generali principle, failed to explore the case under special on-campus tests
like Fraser, deciding instead to adjudicate by using the general Tinker test.108
Nothing short of surprising, this raises plausible questions: since the speech
was declared to be on-campus, should not the general Tinker test be the last
resort,  and  not  the  first  applicable  doctrine?  Moreover,  should  not
the Court,  instead  of  Tinker,  examine  the  case  under  SCOTUS  doctrines
referring  to  on-campus  speech,  and,  only  after  such  analyses,  then  turn
to Tinker?
In my opinion, the foregoing remark and these four decisions reveal that
when  US  jurisprudence  comes  to  cyberbullying  it  can  be  rather
unpredictable and ambiguous. Some courts will  rule in favor of students
in off-campus cases and
“[s]chools  that  act  without showing a substantial  disruption can be held
liable and be forced to pay damages to the bully.”109
However,  under  very  similar  circumstances,  other  courts  will  find
the school  authorities’  actions  constitutionally  permissible.  There  are
no guidelines or uniform jurisprudence in the US court system. Therefore,
every  case  could be  decided either  way depending  on which  court  will
explore and rule on the case.
3. CONCLUSIONS
In this article,  I  analyzed three cases (and four decisions) decided by US
Circuit Courts in order to reveal anomalies in US jurisprudence regarding
cyberbullying.  In  the  course  of  this  research,  I  tried  to  identify  some
of the most crucial problems of US case law on cyberbullying. Since the US
courts ruled on several cyberbullying cases,  I  supposed that an in-depth
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Greenhill 2010-2011, p. 733.
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analysis could identify ambiguous and undecided elements in the existing
judicial  practice.  The analysis  of  Snyder I-II,  Layshock  and Kowalski  aimed
precisely  at  revealing  these  problems.  Pursuant  to  this  logic,  I  focused
on finding  and  highlighting  these  problems,  the  so-called  anomalies.
In my opinion the following issues represent the most important anomalies
in cyberbullying jurisprudence in the US, thus these seem to be the most
urgent to get resolved.
First of all,  the question is  whether  Tinker  is  applicable to off-campus
student freedom of speech cases, or not. According to the analysis that took
place in this paper, I would say, it does, but, as we can see above in Judge
Smith’s concurring opinion in  Snyder II,  this issue is  not the least finally
settled.  However,  we  have  to  accept  the  fact  that  Tinker  is  applicable
to off-campus cases and serve as a general test to any cyberbullying cases,
because the  other  SCOTUS  tests  are  declared  to  be  applicable  only
on-campus scenarios. Without Tinker, courts cannot rule in any off-campus
student  speech  case,  only  if  they  transform  it  into  on-campus  speech.
Therefore, the SCOTUS should finally deliver a landmark ruling regarding
when and under which circumstances an off-campus speech can become
on-campus. Moreover, the role and the importance of the ‘sufficient nexus’
test should be clarified, because as we could see above in Layshock, there this
element  did  not  stand,  but  in  Kowalski  it  did,  having  a  decisive  role
in reaching the decision the Court did.
Second  of  all,  the  SCOTUS  should  call  the  attention  of  the  courts
to the fact that if an off-campus speech is turned into on-campus, courts are
obliged  to  first  apply  the  special  on-campus  tests  instead  of  instantly
referring  to  Tinker.  Such  an  approach  would  be  more compatible
with the ancient legal principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali.
Third  of  all,  if  a  speech  has  a  significant  effect  on  the  school
environment,  but  does  not  turn  into  on-campus  speech,  then  SCOTUS
should  offer  some  guiding  principles  on  which  facts  could  constitute
substantial disruption or foreseeable future substantial disruption, and how
could school employees provide enough evidence to establish such actual
or reasonably foreseeable disruption in the school environment.
Fourth of all,  if  the above facts of an actual or reasonably foreseeable
disruption  are  identified,  the  SCOTUS  may  provide  solutions  on  how
school  authorities,  for  the  purposes  of  relevant  litigation,  could  prove
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the existence  of  a  sufficient  nexus  between  students’  speech
and the reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption.
As a consequence of the analysis herein, we could conclude that the US
court system is faced with a great hurdle when it comes to cyberbullying.
The  courts  are  doing  their  best,  but  without  a  clear  guideline  provided
by the  SCOTUS,  the  foregoing  problems  and  anomalies  will  remain,
and circuit  splits  on  the  federal  level  will  rise  continuously.  Moreover,
we should  highlight  that  this  jurisprudence  not  only  affects  law
enforcement  personnel,  but  the  students,  school  employees,  parents
and every member of the community, who tackle cyberbullying.
As  far  as  I  am  concerned,  the  US  courts  are  on  the  right  track,
but without  a  SCOTUS  landmark  decision  on  this  specific  issue,
the anomalies and problems, unfortunately, will persist and remain.
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